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Introduction 
 
   Man by nature is a gregarious being both in his body and mind. In other words, he likes to 
live in a community.1 This explains the hackneyed adage that no man is an island. Instead he 
is a victim of social inevitability as he must as a matter of necessity willy nilly live in a 
society with other human beings rather than in isolation. For any society to survive or even 
exist, it must inescapably anchor itself on law, which in turn governs the behavior of 
members  of  the  society  in  question,  as  well  as  their  relations,  their  rights  and  obligations.  
Law thus is a mandatory cause of conduct accepted by members of a given society as 
established by the legitimate authority of that society.2 When we talk about law and society, 
we are undoubtedly referring to a group of individuals bound together under a political 
organization, whose very existence is dependent on the quality of the law which has enabled 
that association to come into existence in the first place. Members of the society normally 
have an inherent interest in the preservation of both their individual welfares and that of the 
association. 
    I am not trying to suggest that members of a society would robotically adhere to the laws 
in place. Far from that, the reverse is true. Just as the faces of all men are different, so are the 
members that constitute any human society. They each share varying behaviors ranging 
anywhere from submissiveness to delinquency. The main relevance of the law is to direct the 
society to behave in a particular way or face corresponding sanctions.  The purpose of this 
paper therefore is to examine how human behavior is determined by law or relative to law, 
vis-à-vis the society, crime and punishment. It recognizes the enormous influence of any 
legal system on the behaviors of its citizenry, and asserts that law can through direct or 
indirect enforcement mechanisms either widen or contract the horizon of opportunities within 
which individuals can satisfy their sundry preferences.3 
   Inherent to the activities of any community, society or organization is a potential for order 
and disorder. When we are attempting to control something, we must acutely be conscious of 
what resists us.4 No society in the world however beautifully designed can function in an 
atmosphere of perfect harmony. With every human society constituted of people with 
different behavioral patterns, there is bound to be an element of disharmony at various facets 
of societal intercourse, which in turn necessitates law to act as specific social barometer. This 
                                                             
* The author can be contacted  by email at: amin.forji@helsinki.fi or amingeorges@yahoo.co.uk  
1 See for instance, Gilbert Ryle & Daniel C. Dennett, The concept of mind (University of Chicago Press: 
london/New York, 2000) at 44. 
2 Tom R. Tyler & John M. Darley, Building a Law-Abiding Society: Taking Public Views about Morality and 
the Legitimacy of Legal Authorities into Account When Formulating Substantive Law 28 Hofstra Law Review 
(1999-2000) 707-740. 
3 Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Behavioral Theories of Law and Social Norms 86 Virginia Law Review (2000) 
1603-1648 at 1603. 
4  John Dewey, Human nature and conduct (Dover Publications: New York, 2002) at 1. 
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consists of bringing about “the desired social conduct of men through threat of a measure of 
coercion which is to be applied in case of contrary conduct.”5 Hans Kelsen has asserted that a 
state is defined as a political organization only because the “political” element consists in 
nothing but “the element of coercion.”6Another writer has succinctly observed that for there 
to be an organization or a society, there should be interaction, for there to be interactions 
there should be encounters, and for there to be encounters there should be disorder.7 In other 
words, order and disorder are effectively part and parcel of human society. 
 
The Social Function of Law 
 
    Hans Kelsen has observed that the function of every social order is to “bring about certain 
mutual behavior of individuals; to induce them to certain positive or negative behavior, to 
certain action or abstention from action.”8 Going by the catchphrase maxim ubi societas ibi 
ius,9  the purpose of law is to make social life possible. Naturally, there is a very close bond 
between the individual and his societal environment. Whoever believes in the existence of a 
social order believes in the existence of a legal order. Living together involves setting up 
rules and institutions that regulate this living together.10 There is no other conceivable way by 
which large communities can be constituted other than through some coercive legal orders. 
   As observed in the introduction, law is the cultural force which has that important social 
function of imposing, conducting and/or controlling patterns of human behavior.11 The 
sociology of law is aimed at studying human behavior in society as commonly recognized by 
ethno-legal norms. In other words, it is legal norms that guide, delimit or determine patterns 
of behavior in any human society.12How does this come about? Put differently, what is the 
conditions sine qua non for the effectiveness or non-effectiveness of legal norms vis-à-vis 
human behavior? 
   The specific reality of the law is not obvious in the actual behavior of the individuals who 
are subject to the legal order.13 This is comprehensible given that legal norms are the creation 
of human will. The law as a norm “is an ideal and not a natural reality.”14 The behavior of 
individuals as a consequence may or may not be in conformity with the legal order in place. 
Despite this imbalance, law still both directly and indirectly functions as a specific social 
technique in adjusting human behavior towards a particular social pattern.15 How does law do 
what it does?   
                                                             
5 Hans Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ 9 University Of Chicago Law Review (1941-1942)  
75-97 at 79. 
6 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 82. 
7 Ron Levy, ‘Critical systems thinking: Edgar Morin and the French school of thought’ 4 Systemic Practice and 
Action Research (1991) 89-99 at 97-98[Emphasis added]. 
8 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 75. 
9 Where there is a society, there is law. Conversely, where there is no law, there is no society. See generally 
Hayek, Co-ordination and Evolution: His legacy in philosophy, politics, economics, and the history of ideas, ed. 
Jack birner & Rudy van Zijp, (Routledge: London/ New York, 1994) at 269. 
10 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 75. 
11 Nicolas S. Timasheff, ‘What is “Sociology of Law”?’ 43 The American Journal of Sociology (1937) 225-235 
at 225. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Hans Kelsen, General Theory  of Law and State, translated by Anders Wedberg (Clark Lawbook Exchange: 
New Jersey, 2007) at XIV 
14 Hans Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law. Its Methods and Fundamental Concepts’ 50 Law Quarterly Review 
(1934) 474-498 at 481. 
15 See generally Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’; Robert S. Summers, ‘Technique Element 
in Law’  59 California Law Review (1971) 733-751. 
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    Although very few legal philosophers have been interested in the question, Robert S. 
Summers has nonetheless pivot from a synthesis of the few available literature on the 
subject16 that to achieve its aim, law breaks itself into elements such as legal authority and 
legal rules, moral aspects of law and law’s coercive features.17This is clearly a much 
extensive way of approaching the issue. A more narrow and compelling response can be 
inferred from Hans Kelsen’s assertion that law regulates societal behavior by oscillating the 
principles of reward and punishment, where applicable.18These two principles are 
fundamental for social living. For the sake of convenience, I would make a slight linguistic 
adjustment by re-qualifying these two values respectively as pleasures and pains, loosely 
borrowed  from  Jeremy  Bentham’s  utility  principle,  because  I  believe  these  words  best  
capture the functionality of law vis-à-vis societal behavior.19 Bentham’s  theory  of  
utilitarianism states that the aim of the individual and the legislator in the conduct of the 
society should be to achieve the greatest happiness for the masses.20 
   It is in the interest of the legal order that it strive for genuine justice in order to dissuade 
individuals from inducements to contra bonos mores21. When from a particular conduct, the 
benefits  or  advantages  are  more  than  the  disadvantages  or  sufferings  to  an  individual;  that  
individual can certainly be expected to opt for compliance, because the benefits (pleasures) of 
compliance outweigh the disadvantages (pains) of violation. The reverse conduct would be 
true for a legal system which is prone to injustice, hardship and sufferings to some or most of 
its subjects, given that the latter beside their pains are not giving any motivation to abide to 
the legal order. In this case, the advantages of violation seem just as good if not better as of 
compliance. Law as such functions to shape not only positive behavior but prejudices as 
well.22 
   The efficacy of law depends on its ability to deter at every level of operation (prescription 
(legislating), functional courts and enforcement mechanisms). According to Kelsen, Law 
functions as a specific legal technique by applying the measures of coercion as decreed by the 
legal order.23 I would return to this proposition in due course, given that it has been jettisoned 
in other academic circles.  For now, suffices to state that  it  is  the unpredictability of human 
nature that makes it necessary to establish a legal order as a coercive order. As noted before, 
history has presented man with a social condition of  ubi societas ibi ius. It is obvious from 
the functionality of things that man has not been totally at ease with this condition. He has 
always demonstrated a preferential tendency for a society free from all coercion, “one in 
which there will no longer be any law, or what amounts to the same thing, any state.”24 
 
 
                                                             
16 For instance: Nicholas S Timasheff, An introduction to the sociology of law (New Brunswick: New Jersey/ 
Cambridge, 2001); Hans Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law. Its Methods and Fundamental Concepts’ 50 Law 
Quarterly Review (1934) 474-498; W Schoenfeld, ‘The “response” in behavior theory’ 11 Integrative 
Psychological and Behavioral Science (1976) 129-149; Max Rheinstein, Max Weber on law in economy and 
society (Havard University Press: Cambridge, 1969); Hans Rumpf, ‘Physical aspects of comminution and new 
formulation of a law of comminution’  7 Powder Technology (1972) 145-159. 
17 Summers, ‘Technique Element in Law’ at 733. 
18 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 75. 
19  See also John Stuart Mill, Jeremy Bentham & Alan Ryan, Utilitarianism : and other essays (Penguin Books: 
London, 2004); Nathan D. Grundstein, ‘Bentham's Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation’ 2 
Journal of Public Law (1953) 344-369. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Contrary to good behavior (Morals). 
22 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy’, 
Duke Law Journal. 1. (1990) 1-38. 
23 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 82. 
24 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 82. 
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Ethics (morality), Religion and Behavioral Patterns 
 
    Ethical (moral) and religious norms are strictly speaking not mandatory courses of action 
for any legal system. Theoretically, a social order or legal order on the one hand and a moral 
or religious order on the other hand can exist independently of one another. Meanwhile a high 
moral standard is customarily expected from every individual, a legal order on the one hand 
and a moral or religious order on the other hand “may be considered as two circles which 
cross each other. The overlapping section is law.”25 Law may legislate morality, in which 
case, moral norms would take a legal character.26 There is no gainsaying that the sociology of 
law has to begin “by studying from the causal point of view, the phenomenon of ethics, to 
continue by studying from the same point of view, the phenomenon of power, and to 
conclude by an analysis of the complex phenomenon formed by the joint action of both.”27 
   But moral or religious orders in many respects tend to function in very much the same way 
as legal orders. They all function to suppress evil and bring about socially desired behavior 
through the technique of punishment.28Any norm that does not prescribe behavior simply 
does not exist. Law, morality and religion all compel good conduct (behavior). To talk like 
one writer, they each have a character, content and condition of application.29 It  is  also  
inferred that religious like moral ideologies always more or less accurately mirror social 
reality.30 Indeed,  these  three  orders  all  epitomize  how  social  power  can  dominate  over  
individuals both by means of law as well as outside the law.31  
   The similarities notwithstanding, their actual measure of authority and influence varies 
considerably. The case of murder is a very glaring example. All three orders categorically 
forbid murder. While under a moral order ( for example: ‘Thous shall not kill’), people would 
generally refrain from committing murder because a known murderer would certainly be 
ostracized by fellow men; still there is a great difference with a legal order, whose reaction 
consists of a précised measure of coercion enacted by the order.32 Its efficacy thus rests on its 
coercive character. Under a legal order, a judge would be authorized to punish anyone who 
commits murder with either imprisonment from n years to life imprisonment, or in some 
jurisdictions, in the case of grievous murder with a death penalty. 
   A moral reaction to an immoral offence is neither prescribed by a moral order nor socially 
oriented.33 Its efficacy rests on voluntary obedience. Religious norms like legal norms on 
their part threaten the murderer with punishment, however not in the murderer’s lifetime but 
after death by a super-being. Meanwhile religious norms are apparently more effective than 
legal norms, despite no physical force involved, that efficacy principally presupposes a 
                                                             
25 Timasheff, ‘What is “Sociology of Law”? at 231. 
26 Kelsen has  used the following hypothesis to illustrate the operation of moral versus legal norms: “The 
specific technique of the law-the technique of indirect motivation- consists in the very fact that it attaches to 
certain conditions certain coercive measures as consequences. Morality whose technique is direct motivation 
says, thou shall not still. The law says, if one steals, he shall be punished. The moral norm regulates the behavior 
of one individual; the legal norm, always that of at least two individuals, he whose behavior furnishes the 
condition of the sanction (the subject) and he whose duty it is to apply the sanction (the organ)…” (Kelsen, ‘The 
Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 87 ). 
27 Timasheff, ‘What is “Sociology of Law”? at 231. 
28 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 78. 
29 Henrik Georg Von Wright, Norm and Action: A Logical Enquiry (Routledge & Kegan Paul: London, 1963) at 
70. 
30 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 78. (The institution of marriage is one good example of 
a contract that is regulated by all three orders. While under a moral order, it is based on voluntary compliance; 
under religious and legal orders, certain rules are actually in place to regulate the contract).  
31 Timasheff, ‘What is “Sociology of Law”? at 231. 
32 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 80. 
33 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 80. 
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“belief in the existence of a superhuman authority.”34Unlike a legal order which is 
determinate  in  nature  thanks  to  its  coercive  character,  any  reliance  on  a  moral  or  religious  
order ultimately boils down to a reliance on utopia, because human actions are anecdotal.35 
Irrespective of whatever form it takes, any adherence to law, whether willingly or 
involuntarily would naturally presuppose a sense of motivation and “coercion”. While in the 
case of legal rules, such deterrence involves the fear of the application of force or coercive 
measure against the individual’s will; in the case moral or ethical obedience, deterrence or 
loss of freedom takes the form of coercion in the psychological sense.36 I would return to this 
comparison much later in the essay, but more with respect to the determination of appropriate 
sanctions for socially injurious behaviors. Suffice it to say at this point that law normally 
regulates its own creation, and by imposing a certain conduct seeks to induce the opposite 
behavior.37  
 
Theorizing crime and behavior 
 
   Several theories and schools of thought have been expounded to relate crime and behavior 
(or crime and delinquency) since the 18thcentury following the birth of criminology as a 
science.  Some  of  these  include  the  classical,  the  neo-classical,  the  positivists,  the  
sociological, Urbanization, differential opportunity, anomy, functionalist, cultural conflict, 
psychological,  radical  or  critical,  Austrian  and  cartographic  schools  of  criminology.  There  
has been as much colossal variation in orientation amongst these schools as there have been 
writers on the subject.  
    The conspicuous disparity amongst criminologists in one respect is a clear reminder that 
there could be hundreds of explanations out that as to why crime is committed or why a 
person may chose to behave in an anti-social manner. Even if these schools severally look at 
the incidence of crime from purely different perspectives, in one sense, I perceive it as 
demonstrative of their common enthusiastic quest on the relationship between law, crime, 
criminals and punishment. There is a common understanding amongst them to the effect that 
behind every offense there is a cause.  Even if there is little disagreement on this principle, 
the reverse is true on what constitutes that “cause”. Why do people commit crimes? What 
accounts for delinquent behavior? What is the main motivation? Is there any connecting link 
between criminals?  
   In the following section, I would attempt an answer to the above questions by evaluating 
the two most prominent though conflicting schools of thought on criminal behavior and law 
namely, the classical versus positivist schools of criminology.  
 
     
Of Criminal Behavior and Law-making 
                                                             
34 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 80. Kelsen has noted  that voluntary obedience “ is in 
itself a form of motivation, that is coercion, and hence is not freedom, but it is coercion in the psychological 
sense.” (Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 80). 
35 It is still argued in some circles that it would inappropriate to apportion hierarchical value to the various social 
orders based on their ability or inability to administer sanctions. Even Hans Kelsen has been conflicted on this 
issue. In one passage, he wrote thus: “From a realistic point of view the decisive difference is not between social 
orders whose efficacy rests on sanctions and those whose efficacy is not based on sanctions. Every social order 
is somehow sanctioned by the specific reaction of the community to conduct of its members corresponding to or 
at variance with the order. This is also true of highly developed moral systems, which most closely approach the 
type of direct motivation by sanctionless norms.” (Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 76.). 
36 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 79. 
37 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 87. 
 




   Kelsen’s conception of reward and punishment which I have already highlighted is a clear 
pointer to the ultimate intent of any legal system, that is, to stimulate good behavior in the 
society. The social behavior of individuals, Kelsen observed, is always accompanied by a 
judgment of value, namely, the idea that conduct in accordance with the order is ‘good’ 
whereas the contrary to the order is ‘bad’.38 Put plainly, the law gives incentives to desirable 
behaviors and punishment to socially injurious conducts.  Every social conduct inevitably 
produces a certain comparable legal effect. Members of the society are expected to be fully 
conscious of this fact. It is indeed that consciousness that guides their decisions in doing or 
not doing a thing.  Cesare Beccaria (1738 – 1794) reportedly wrote that “In order for 
punishment not to be, in every instance, an act of violence of one or of many against a private 
citizen, it must be essentially public, prompt, necessary, the least possible in the given 
circumstances, proportionate to the crimes, dictated by the laws.”39 
   The search for answers to criminal behavior is neither new nor easy. And this is certainly 
not for lack of trying. What is it that prompts some individuals into crimes while others do 
not? In order to answer the above question, it would be imperative to thoroughly evaluate the 
approaches of the two leading schools of thought on criminology and criminal behavior, to 
wit: the Classical versus the Positivist Schools of Criminology. The two schools are like two 
parallel streams that flow together but never meet, in that they are both as concerned on the 
correlation between society, law and human behavior though with very contrasting 
perceptions. While the classical school40 has essentially focused on law-making, the positivist 
school41 on  its  part  has  concentrated  itself  with  the  study  of  criminals.  While  the  former’s  
findings have been naturalistic, those of the latter have been largely spiritualistic.42 As a 
result, the classical school has traced criminality to bad laws. The positivists have 
contradicted by linking it to bad people.  
 
The Classical Doctrine 
 
   The classical school is the brain-box behind the idea of pleasures and pains or benefits and 
costs as Beccaria termed it. The school grew in the late 18th century in the aftermath of the 
French revolution. Most classical thinking ideas were a reformulation of the philosophies of 
the age of enlightenment, notably the earlier writings of John Locke (1632-1704), Jean-
Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), Charles Louis Montesquieu (1689-1755) and Thomas 
Hobbes (1588-1679). With English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) and Italian 
                                                             
38 Kelsen, ‘The Law As A Specific Social Technique’ at 76. 
39 Cesare Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments (Trans. Henry Paolucci. Englewood: New Jersey/New York, 1963 
at 99. 
40 For instance: Edward D Ingraham, An essay on crimes and punishments [Translated from the Italian of Cesare 
Beccaria; Commentary by marchese di Voltaire] (Philip H. Nicklin Walker, printer: Philadelphia, 1819); Jeremy 
Bentham, An introduction to the principles of morals and legislation (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1970); Cesare 
Beccaria, Crimes and Punishments (Trans. Henry Paolucci. Englewood: New Jersey/New York, 1963).  
41 For instance: David Horn, The Criminal Body: Lombroso and the Anatomy of Deviance (Routledge: New 
York, 2003); Cesare Lombrosso, Crime [Translated by Henry P. Horton] (Reprinted, Montclair-Patterson Smith 
Reprint: New Jersey, 1968); Cesare Lombroso, Criminal man [translated by Mary Gibson & Nicole Hahn 
Rafter] (Duke University Press: Durham, 2006); Enrico Ferri, Criminal Sociology (Reprint, BiblioLife: New 
York, 2009) ; Raffaele Garofalo, Criminology (1914) [translated by Robert Wyness Millar, Introduction by E. 
Ray Stevens] (Reprint, Kessinger Publishing:Whitefish Montana, 2008). 
42 Ezzat A. Fattah, Criminology: Past, Present and Future: A Critical Overview (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 
1997) at 207-214; George B. Vold, Theoretical Criminology (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1979). Vold 
distinguished between the two concepts by observing that the naturalistic theory can be explained within the 
world of physical and material factors; which factors guides human behavior. The spiritualistic theory on the 
other hand postulates that humans are controlled by external objects or spirits, thus affecting our behaviors. 
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philosopher Cesare Beccaria (1738 – 1794) as its forerunners; the school sought to correct 
what it perceived to be a barbaric system of law prevailing in Europe before 1789. It based its 
focus not on criminals as later did the positivists but instead on law-making and law-
processes. Many scholars across Europe at the time shared a general sense of disillusionment 
with the various legal systems; seen as prejudiced, snobby, discriminatory, tyrannical and 
elitist. For instance, prior to 1789, most judges across Europe enjoyed uninhibited power and 
paid allegiance to no other institution but the “crown”.43They melted out inconsistent 
punishments  to  offenders  irrespective  of  the  severity  of  the  offence;  a  practice  sometimes  
described as dependent on what the “judge ate for breakfast”44 At the time, both accused and 
convicted persons were detained at the same institutions. Conceiving criminal behavior to be 
as a result of cruel and excessive punishments, one of the main convictions of the classical 
was to the effect that criminality would be contained if the criminal justice system underwent 
a thorough reformation by providing fair and equal treatment to all accused offenders.45 
    The classical doctrine sought to correct this by emphasizing that both laws and 
punishments must be just, equitable and non-discriminatory.46 Given that laws are designed 
to coordinate human activities, it goes without saying that they must themselves first exhibit a 
human character. The history of the world from the perspective of Social Contract theorists47 
can be divided into two clear periods to wit: the period before and the period after the state. 
In the first period, there is no government or law (state of nature). In the second, there is a 
contract between the subjects in nature (that is, the government and the people). According to 
John  Locke,  the  raison-d’être  of  establishing  a  government  was  to  move  men away from a  
state of nature, given that men in the state of nature were too often judges in their own 
cases.48 A civil society was vital to guarantee peace and a common judge to settle disputes for 
everyone.49 The Classical school upheld this view that there was an unwritten social contract 
between every people and its rulers. Thomas Hobbes contended that the sovereigns were the 
beneficiaries of the “contractual authorization”, while John Locke added that the nature of the 
relationship between the sovereign and the people was one of trust.50By entering into a social 
contract, people conceded that a peaceful society would be more beneficiary to their self 
interests. Criminal behavior on the other hand would be more costly because of the specific 
sanctions. The constitution and institutions of government are in place to ensure that 
individuals conform to the dictates of reason and justice since “the passions of men will not 
conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint”.51  
  The premise of the classical school was to the effect that humans were essentially rational 
creatures whose reasoning faculty placed them far above all other animals. Thus, criminal 
behavior could only be best understood and tackled through the application of reason and 
intelligence. Criminal behavior can be contained by simply applying the tenets of human 
                                                             
43 Mainstream Europe was essentially monarchical, and this reflected in the criminal justice system as well. 
44 An old Common Law parlance denoting the abuses of Lord Chancellors as guarantors of equity in England. 
See generally, Brian Z. Tamanaha, ‘The Realism of Judges Past and Present’  56 Cleveland State Law Review 
(2008) 77-91. 
45 Ezzat A. Fattah, Criminology: Past, Present and Future: A Critical Overview (Palgrave Macmillan: London, 
1997) at 189-191. 
46 Fattah, Criminology: Past, Present and Future at 192. 
47 The proponents of this theory include Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau and John Rawls. 
48 Steven R. Schlesinger, ‘Civil Disobedience: The Problem of Selective Obedience to Law’ 3 Hastings 
Constitutional Law Quarterly (1975-1976) 947-960 at 950-951. 
49 Schlesinger, ‘Civil Disobedience’ at 951. 
50 David Boucher & Paul Kelly (Eds.), The Social Contract From Hobbes To Rawls (Routledge: New York/ 
London/ Toronto, 1994) at 75. 
51 Schlesinger, ‘Civil Disobedience’ at 951. 
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nature shared by all of us. By portraying humans as hedonistic,52 the classical school sought 
to  illustrate  that  man’s  rationality  without  doubt  enables  him  to  consider  which  courses  of  
action are really for his self-interests. 
   While Beccaria focused much on the law and its effects on humans, his fellow proponent, 
Bentham labored on devising a universal concept of just law called utilitarianism-the greatest 
happiness for the greatest number of people. Bentham’s utilitarianism is so closely related to 
the modern concept of democracy: “government of the people, by the people and for the 
people.”53 Beccaria contended that man in his normal state was free and rational, basing his 
actions on costs and benefits. He posited that criminal behavior just like any other human 
behavior is a rational choice freely made by anyone based on “pains” and “pleasures”. It is 
the duty of the law to equitably match crimes with corresponding punishments.  Both 
Beccaria and Bentham were convinced that punishment would deter criminality only if it was 
certain and swift, rather through long trials. 
If society increased or reduced the costs or benefits, that individual would also act 
accordingly. The individual would for instance choose legitimate options over illegitimate 
alternatives where the benefits of compliance outpaced the costs of violation.  
   All things being equal, Beccaria contended, people would naturally follow their self-
interests, if they were left on their own. Moreover, individuals would not engage in crimes 
unless they are convinced that the proceeds from the crime far outweigh the resulting 
punishment.54 Beccaria was impelled to this position as a reaction to the system of law and 
justice that was prevalent in the 18th century  across  Europe.  He  came  to  believe  that  most  
criminal justice agencies and the laws in place encouraged abusive practices caused by the 
enjoyment of too much freedom in dealing with criminals.55As a remedy, he advocated for a 
routine control of governmental establishments, justice and equality before the law and most 
importantly, popular participation in the shaping of institutions. 
    Beccaria’s objection of the status quo earned him an enviable recognition as one of the 
most distinguished philosophers of the Age of Enlightenment, and its intellectual 
development. He forcefully posited that it was crucial for punishment not to exceed the barest 
minimum required to guarantee public peace and order.56Accordingly, he saw capital 
punishment, secret trials and torture as immoral and unjustifiable, arguing that not only were 
they stupid and ineffective but savage as well.57 
    Bentham was moved by Beccaria’s proposition to the extent that he made a slight linguistic 
adjustment to his costs and benefits concepts opting for more subtle-sounding adjectives 
namely, pleasures and pains. He also solicited for the implementation of Beccaria’s ideas in 
England in 1780, which at the time had at least 300 different offenses warranting the death 
penalty.58 Like Beccaria, Bentham believed that no one needed to be killed for a serious sin. 
Instead, the law should be reformed to prevent irrational behaviors. His Utilitarian theory as 
afore-noted  is  grounded  on  the  idea  that  the  aim  of  the  individual  and  the  legislator  in  the  
conduct of the society should be to achieve the greatest happiness for the 
                                                             
52 The philosophical idea that people are driven by their own self-interests (pains and pleasures (or costs and 
benefits) in doing or not doing a thing). 
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masses.59Individuals, he contended are naturally prone to the probabilities of present and 
future pains and pleasures. In other words, they weigh all odds and decide on whether or not 
to commit crimes. Consequently, punishment should be made to surpass the pleasures of gain 
from a criminal act.60 
 
 
The Positivist Doctrine 
 
   As afore-stated, criminal behavior could only be properly dealt with if it was well 
understood.61 But considering the diversity in opinion, it is fair to say that such an 
understanding can only rest in the eyes of the beholder. In fact, the classical theorists 
proposed one way of looking at criminal behavior, and the positivists suggested another. 
Developed around the 1820s, the positivist school quite contrary to the classical theorists 
focused wholly on the criminal rather than legal issues and crime prevention. The school was 
heavily inspired by Charles Darwin’s evolution theory.62Darwin perceived humans as 
belonging  to  the  same  specie  with  other  animals  except  that  humans  had  a  higher  level  of  
development.63 The behavior of humans could be explained through biological and cultural 
evolution “rather than as self-determining beings who were free to do what they wanted.”64 In 
other words, the positivist did not conceive humans as having a free will of their own. 
Instead, their behaviors were determined by a correlation of various biological, sociological 
and psychological factors. This presupposes that one is not supposed to be criminally 
responsible; since according to this interpretation, criminality evolves out of one’s biological 
or psychological atavism. Erdson H. Sutherland, one of the fervent followers of this doctrine has 
advanced the following biological explanation: 
                One of the theories presented as an explanation of the the age ratios in crime is that they 
are due directly to biological traits such as physical strength and vigour: crimes are 
committed frequently by persons who are strong and active and infrequently by persons 
who are weak and passive. Another biological theory is that crimes are concentrated in 
three periods, ages three to six, fourteen to sixteen, and forty-two to forty-five, and that 
these periods are products of libidinal tides due to changes in the instincts of sex and 
aggression  and  to  changes  in  the  ego  strength.  A  third  biological  theory  is  that  
inheritance is the direct cause.65 
   Instead, attention has to be placed on those factors that are believed to be at the root causes 
of criminality. The school also rejected the concept of Nulla Poena Sine Lege66 in favour of a 
proposition  that  punishment  must  fit  the  individual  criminal  rather  than  the  crime.67The 
treatment of criminals must go along scientific methods. The scientific study of criminal 
behavior, the school upholds would uncover the root causes of such behavior. As to why 
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people commit crimes, the school led by its founding father, Italian born Cesare Lombroso 
(1835-1909) took an unqualified stand that some people are by nature born 
criminals.68Criminality is thus hereditary.   
    To Lombroso, most criminals were biologically defective hence inferior and unexpected to 
be law abiding.69Having established that the  “criminal man” was a subhuman type, a modern 
savage with physical features similar to those of  lower primates such as apes, Lombroso 
subsequently stated that the behavior of such a biological atavist would inevitably be contrary 
to the rules and standards expected in a civilized society.70 Criminal types, he continued, 
could be identified by the shape of their skulls which clearly confirmed them as atavistic or 
savage. In his book, Criminal Man71, Lombroso elaborated his rather controversial thesis at 
length based on his personal scientific findings and experiments. While working at a mental 
facility and various prisons as a psychiatrist, he purportedly observed some similarities in the 
physiques of the various prisoners. His sample included inmates, patients and delinquent 
soldiers. Upon observing and analyzing their skulls, he came to the conclusion that some of 
them had inherited their criminal tendencies. He also observed that there were three broad 
categories of criminals namely: the born criminal, the insane criminal and the criminaloids.72 
   The methods of Lombroso were as weird as his findings.  Performing a post mortem on the 
skull of a notorious criminal called Villella; Lombroso claimed to have diagnosed the roots of 
criminality. It is as a result of a biological abnormality inborn in some people. Upon opening 
Villella’s skull, he claimed to have noticed a depression in the cerebellum which he 
determined was an abnormal atavism.73 The middle lobe of the cerebellum was enlarged. The 
significance of this atavism, he asserted was demonstrative of the tendency by some human 
beings to return to their distant type, which is a throwback to a more primitive human being.74 
   Lombroso clinical research method was however far from being an isolated incident. A 
fellow positivist, Baron Raffaele Garofalo (1851-1934) in his book Criminology, 
distinguished between “natural crimes”(to which he attached great importance) and police 
crimes (a residual category of lesser importance), before settling down on a newfound 
concept called  “danger”, whereupon he emphasized that society needed to be protected from 
dangerous elements.75Natural crimes are those “which violate two basic altruistic sentiments, 
pity (revulsion against the voluntary infliction of suffering on others) and property (respect 
for the property rights of others). Police crimes on the other hand are “behaviours which do 
not offend these altruistic sentiments but are nonetheless called criminal by law.”76 The 
notion of dangerousness itself was built around mental health legislation and criminal justice 
administration. It essentially meant people who are considered to be of moral high risks to 
themselves or the society at large. So, it clearly targeted offenders and not the law.77 Natural 
crimes, Morrison has pointed out are particularly important for at least two reasons. Not only 
are they more serious but also provide a more unifying principle which connects criminal law 
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with natural social processes.78Garofalo asserted that in order to understand the society and 
social phenomenon, we must seek application in natural sciences. He demonstrated for 
instance that suicides and self injury were directly connected to peoples’ lack of connection 





  The Classical and the Positivist schools of criminology each present us with an extreme 
position. The irony in it all is that both concepts vibrantly reflect that intellectual revolution 
in criminal justice thinking since the age of enlightenment. While the classical doctrine is 
heavily based on hedonism, the positivist orientation suggests an unconventional scientific 
(clinical) examination of criminals. Whichever way we appreciate either doctrine, there can 
be no denying the fact that both positions are tainted with noticeable loopholes.  
   The classical school is obviously so inclined to law based on its idea of self interests. In real 
life, things are not as simplistic as the school tends to have it. For instance, it is not a very 
easy  task  for  humans  to  adjust  pains  and  pleasures  in  order  to  arrive  at  comfortable  doses  
necessarily to influence their doing or not doing a thing. The supposition that everybody is 
literally equal before the law is either flawed, misguided or both, because such an assumption 
not only disregards individual differences but their circumstantial realities as well. 
   There is ambiguity as well in the  positivists’ linking of biological traits to the criminality. 
Lombrosso’s exclusive utilization of criminals in his clinical examination leaves a cloud of 
doubt whether he would have reached a different scientific outcome had he included non-
criminals in his experiment. 
   Despite the above discrepancies both doctrines have nonetheless stirred remarkable changes 
in traditional thinking about society and human nature. They have both signaled the necessity 
for society to set legitimate goals for its constituents. With one firm on the proposition that 
learned (classical) and another that it is rather earned (positivists), it remains even in present 
times to connect the two doctrines. There can be a gist of truth in either hypothesis, except 
that in actual fact, both assertions are no more than gross overstatements.  
   Both doctrines fail to answer one very important question. Which is leaned or earned more: 
is it delinquent or non-delinquent behavior? Does earning prevent one from learning criminal 
behavior and vice-versa?  If indeed all normal humans are created equal, it goes without 
saying that they all possess similar potentials to adjust (whether by earning or learning) to 
law and order. The difference may therefore rather lie in other societal factors such as 
environmental, cultural, economic, political, etc. It is common sense that a poor upbringing 
and exposure to crime is a breeding ground par excellence. Given the complexities of humans 
and society, it is fair to say that the categories of crime can never be closed. 
   In-between the discrepancies between the two doctrines, one particular group of critics, 
notably adherents of anomie80 (normlessness) have observed that beyond theory, both the 
classical and the positivists’ postulations are inadequate in explaining the realities of social 
order.  
  While it is necessary for society to set legitimate goals (social coexistence, government, rule 
of law,…), such goals are only important if they are matched with legitimate means 
(education, finance, justice, politics, handwork), to facilitate their realization. However, 
societal goals always come with barriers, thus propelling the way for reactive behavior by 
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those people who do not see a leeway of attaining their self interests. Proponents of anomie 
have identified at least four ways that an individual faced between means and barriers can 
react, to wit: he can either learn to live with his handicap situation or simply retreat, or 
innovate by seeking ways to break the law (that is, finds deviant outlets), he can ritualize (for 





Administering Sanction: General Public and public Official 
 
      The debate so far has been centered on theoretical precepts explaining the correlation 
between behavior and law as pillars of human sociology. I have also established that law is a 
coercive normative order. I now intend to conclude by moving the discussion further by 
deconstructing why and how agents of the legal system (public officials) apply the measures 
of coercion (sanctions) decreed by the legal order. I have already pointed out that every social 
order  is  tailored  to  function  as  specific  response  to  the  pragmatism  of  a  given  community.  
Thus, the individual enforcing the punishment in effect acts as an agent of the social 
community.81 The legal sanction is interpreted as “an act of the legal community; the 
transcendental  sanction-the  sickness  or  death  of  the  sinner-is  an  act  of  the  superhuman  
authority of the deceased ancestors, of God.”82For the purpose of specificity, discussion in 
this section would however exclude non-legal social orders (religion and morality), since law 
is the primary normative order that stipulates sanctions, and moreover because state officials 
are primarily mandated to enforce legal instruments and not moral or religious ordinances.  
   An examination of the role of the official is important because a legal instrument in itself is 
nothing but a piece of paper used as a medium for expressing law. A typical dynamic of the 
law is that positive law not only has to be created. It has to be applied.83The public official’s 
presence not only facilitates the enforcement process but transforms the purpose of the law 
into reality.  
   As noted earlier, while in the case of murder, the law strictly forbids the killing of another 
human being, punishment is incumbent on the judge who by the same text is authorized to 
levy an imprisonment penalty or a death sentence in the worse scenario on anyone found 
guilty of that offense. The text can thus be read from two angles thus: first, the prohibition 
clause that ‘one ought not kill another’, then the consequential ‘if-clause’ of the rule, which 
clearly is an invitation to the public official (judge) to apply the analogous sanction whenever 
there is murder.84The violation of the primary legal obligation triggers criminal proceedings 
in view of applying the consequential sanctions. 
   The coercive character of the law signifies law’s function in controlling human behavior 
specifically by prescribing punishment. This seems to have been the starting point for Kelsen. 
To him, every legal system is made up of laws (coercive norms) which boils down to 
instructions to state officials to apply force (sanctions).85Every law in its raw state, Kelsen 
noted, obligates the society to observe a particular behavior under certain circumstances.86But 
left to themselves, individual members of the society would certainly not robotically adhere 
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to legal caveats. It is only through the authoritative intervention of public officials who apply 
sanctions for all violations that law gets its intended meaning. Indeed, Kelsen’s contention is 
that not only do all legal norms prescribe sanctions but every legal norm by default mandates 
the public official to apply the sanction.87 
   Kelsen’s conception of the legal system and the public official has been criticized by some 
scholars for being too rigid. His main critic, Herbert Hart has pointed out that Kelsen’s theory 
is a disservice to the social function of law, for as he puts it, law is primarily addressed to the 
society at large and not just the public official.88 Hart’s main fear is that too much focus on 
the public official would blur whose behavior constitutes the main target of the law, which to 
Hart, is that of the general public.89 Some other writers are of the opinion that there are 
actually two separate norms for the general public and the public officials.  
   Jeremy Bentham for instance has observed that “the law which converts an act into an 
offense, and the law which directs the punishment of that offense, are, properly speaking, 
neither the same law nor parts of the same law.”90 Thus why Kelsen’s theory sees the same 
norm as directed to regulate two different behaviors (general public and public official), Hart 
and Bentham provide that a legal norm can address only one person (behavior) at a 
time.91Hart has equally rejected Kelsen’s insistence on sanctions to violations, arguing in 
return that “law without sanctions is perfectly conceivable.”92Such is the case with non-
binding legislations (soft laws) and prostitution.93 
  All the aforementioned hypothesis, irrespective of whether they conceive a legal norm as 
applying to one person (behavior) at a time or two separate behaviors, apparently presuppose 
the existence of legal personality for all members of the society. My observation is that it is 
only by stretch, notably the laying of too much emphasis on the public official94that Kelsen, 
Hart and Bentham formulated their various theses. The problem is that they all overlook the 
fact that legal personality in practical sense is not acquired by default. Instead, it is the legal 
system that arbitrarily decides who to give or deny legal personality. For instance, most 
slaves were generally accepted as belonging to the human race, but for the most part, they 
were regarded as lacking legal personality. There has also been an ongoing debate on the 
status of Guantanamo detainees. The US government has been deliberately vague on their 
legal status. Until the US government comes out clean, it can be said that these detainees in 
effect lack legal personality.   
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